The paper examines the identification of the "middle class" using data from LIS and LWS. It first considers definitions based purely on income, examining the rationale for different approaches and illustrating the implications for changes over time. It argues that the concept of "class" requires the examination of other dimensions beyond income. The paper considers the role of property and, drawing on the sociological literature, of occupations.
Introduction
"There is no shortage of talk about the middle class (say, the middle 60 percent of income recipients)" -Robert Solow notes on the cover of Estache and Leipziger (2009) .
There is however a certain penumbra surrounding the definition of the "middle class". People use the term in many different ways: "In fact, being middle class has always been a slippery business. Having servants, renting a good property, owning a good property, owning a business, being employed in one of 'the professions', how you speak, how you use cutleryat different times, all these have been regarded as essentials of middle-class life" (Beckett 2010 ). Interestingly, income does not feature among these characteristics, suggesting that the layman's perception may well differ from the neat, yet narrow, income-based definition favoured by economists, as exemplified by Solow's quotation.
In this paper, we consider various definitions of the middle class, and explore how far they can be implemented using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and its twin Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS). 2 2 All estimates are computed from the database as of 10 May 2011 and are reported in the Appendix. Disposable money income is the sum of all cash incomes earned by the household, net of income taxes and social contributions. Net worth includes all real and financial assets except for business equity (unavailable in some We first examine definitions based purely on the dimension of personal income, on which there has been a large economics literature. We then move on to consider the role of property and wealth, which is important in identifying the middle class in popular discourse, as just seen, but which may also be grounded in the economic analysis of household finances. We lastly investigate the importance of the occupational structure. Control over resources and position in the division of labour were at the root of class differences in classical economics, but receive less attention nowadays, prompting the sociologists' criticism that the over-emphasis on income leads economists to neglect the more fundamental social stratification embodied in labour market relations (e.g., Goldthorpe 2010 ). Our aim is to expound meanings and interrelationships of these different notions as well as to assess the extent of overlapping in the ensuing classifications. This will eventually lead us, in the final section, to argue for the re-integration of different approaches to the concept of middle class.
A fixed-size income middle class
In economics, interest in the middle class appears to stem in part from the perception that distributional studies have focused on the poor, at one end, and on the rich, at the other end, leaving out the middle. Solow's reference to the "middle 60 per cent" could be The countries are selected among those for which suitable data are available in the LIS countries), net of all liabilities. Income and wealth are divided by the square root of household size and then attributed to each household's member. Zero incomes are dropped and observations are bottom-coded at 1 per cent of the mean equivalent income and top-coded at 10 times the median unadjusted income. database and cover a wide spectrum of political, institutional and economic arrangements, 3 while the two years span a period of almost two decades characterised by radical economic and political changes. The variations between these two years provide some information about long-run tendencies, although some caution is needed as the selected years may correspond to different business cycle conditions and need not coincide with the critical junctures that identify the relevant episodes in the evolution of income distribution. 4 Ranking the fifteen countries by increasing size of the income share accruing to the middle 60 per cent yields a familiar pattern: in 2004 the Nordic nations have shares of above 55 percent, preceding the corporatist European countries; Canada, Taiwan, Poland and Italy come next, followed by the United States and the United Kingdom, with shares around 51 percent; Mexico is the country with the smallest middle income share at 44 percent. The difference is sizeable: the UK and US middle class receive a share of total income which is about a tenth less than that of their Nordic counterparts. There is clearly a strong correspondence between this country ranking and that based on the degree of inequality: the correlation coefficient between the income share of the middle 60 per cent and the Gini index is negative and well above 0.9 in both years. But it is the change in the middle class share that has received most attention, particularly among those worrying about the disappearing middle. Figure 1 shows that the share, defined in this way, has fallen in all countries but Denmark between the mid-1980s and 2004, and that this loss was consistently to the benefit of the richest fifth, except in France. Source: Author's calculations from the LIS database, as of 10 May 2011.
The evidence of an impoverished middle class is another facet of the trends towards greater inequality prevailing in many countries since the 1980s. This is not, however, the only way in which the middle class can be defined.
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Fixing income boundaries for the middle class
The approach discussed so far treats the definition of middle class in terms of the cumulative distribution, F, or the "people space" in Foster and Wolfson's (2010) terminology. Lawrence (1984) , Bluestone and Harrison (1988) and Beach, Chaykowski and Slotsve (1997) define the middle class in terms of labour earnings rather than income. More recently, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) , Goos and Manning (2007) , and Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) Source: Authors' elaboration.
The left hand part of Figure 2 is that on which the income distribution literature tends to concentrate; the right hand part is more familiar to labour economists, and tells us who belongs to the middle class. Reading the correspondents of It is not obvious, however, why we should take F as the primitive concept. Indeed, such an identification rules out any discussion of the size of the middle class. The middle class cannot "shrink" or "expand". Looking at Figure 2 , we can see that an obvious alternative is to treat y as the primitive concept: people are in the middle class whose income lies between y 1 and y 2 , so that the size of the middle class is given by the difference F 2 -F 1 (the income share can be read on the horizontal axis of the left quadrant). What are the income limits that define the middle class? The economics literature is said to be "converging" (Ravallion 2010, 446) on the definition of these income limits relatively:
Absolute income limits are more common in analyses of the middle class in developing countries or at the global level (Milanovic and Yitzhaki 2002; Banerjee and Duflo 2008; Ravallion 2010) , but were also used in earlier studies for the United States (Bradbury 1986; Horrigan and Haugen 1988 Soltow 1989, 47) .
This may lead us either to accept "…the premise that middle class living standards begin when poverty ends", as put by Ravallion (2010, 446) , or to take instead a more conservative approach and fix a level so as "…to ensure that the lower endpoint of the middle class represents an income significantly above the poverty level", as suggested by Horrigan and Haugen (1988, 5) . In the EU, the former criterion would bring us to identify the lower bound with the at-risk-of-poverty line, set at 60 per cent of the median, whereas the second criterion would rationalise the 75 per cent cut-off as defining the "margins" of poverty as plus a quarter of the at-risk-of-poverty line. The middle class can then be said to be those "comfortably"
clear of being at-risk-of-poverty. 70 per cent of the median as the lower limit). Peichl, Schaefer and Scheicher (2010, 608) further raise the richness line to twice the median, describing it as "arbitrary but common practice", whereas Brzezinski (2010) also considers lines equal to three and four times the median. Danziger, Gottschalk and Smolensky (1989) define the rich as families with incomes more than nine times the poverty line; Rank and Hirschl (2001) raise this multiplier to ten.
With a US poverty line approximately one third of the median disposable household income (Smeeding 2006, 71) , these values imply a cut-off around 300 per cent of median income.
How can these choices of the upper demarcation level be justified? Medeiros (2006) defines the richness line as that level of income such that the sum of all incomes above it exactly matches the aggregate poverty gap. The problem with this definition is that the affluence score would fall whenever a government reduces poverty: but countries that do well on this account may still have a rich upper class.
Use of a relative measure is common. Over a century ago, Watkins argued that the definition of "rich" is essentially relative: "the rich of former days would not even be 'respectably poor' in New York City to-day" (1907, (3) (4) . So the upper cut-off could be taken as rising with the median countries where the middle class indisputably shrunk both proportions increased, indicating that income distribution polarised. Yet, the top panel of Figure 4 shows that, with few exceptions, the population share of the rich went up more than that of the poor, so that the overall net change was towards higher rather than lower income ranges. Italy stands out as the only country where there was a shift from the top to the middle together with a (more moderate) shift from the middle to the bottom. Source: Author's calculations from the LIS database, as of 10 May 2011.
The shrinking middle and polarisation
In his study of the shrinking middle class hypothesis in the United Kingdom during the 1980s, Jenkins (1995, 410) argues that considering the entire income distribution by means of kernel density estimates may reveal information that would be missed by using a specific middle class definition, such as the fact that "… the shift away from the middle was asymmetric, with the increase in density within the higher income ranges much greater than the increase at the lowest income ranges". This idea is further developed by Burkhauser et al. (1999) 8 In a different approach, Esteban and Ray (1994) and later Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004, 1747) characterise polarisation as "… the interplay of two forces: identification with one's own group and alienation vis-à-vis others"; social classes are endogenously defined but not explicitly identified. Figure 5 reports the change in this index, in the version used by Wolfson (1994) , between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s for the fifteen countries of our 9 Foster and Wolfson's polarisation index is equal to (T−G)μ/m, where μ and m are the mean and median incomes, G is the Gini coefficient, and T is the ratio to the mean of the average income distance between those above the median and those below the median. Since the term (T−G) is equal to the Gini coefficient between the upper and lower halves of the distribution minus the weighted inequality within these two subgroups, "more inequality between the upper and lower halves of the distribution will tend to raise both inequality and polarization; a greater level of within-group inequality raises overall inequality, but lowers polarization" (Foster and Wolfson 2010, 266) . Wolfson (1994) 
Property and the middle class
The instructions for the Swedish Census of 1810 were based on the ability to make ends meet, taking as a reference the necessary expenditure. Nothing in those instructions implies that income should be the only variable used in the class definition. Rather, the reference to debts seems to suggest a broader concept of economic resources, incorporating income and wealth and the possibility to access credit. Two centuries later, the official report These considerations suggest that the middle class status may be closely linked to the possession of real and financial assets. On one side, the value of wealth holdings may help to define the upper limit of the middle class. As suggested by Atkinson (2008 ) and Eisenhauer (2008 , 2011 , the wealthy can be identified with "people who do not need to work", that is individuals whose net worth is large enough to enable them to live off the interest while avoiding paid employment. Atkinson treats as rich those people whose wealth exceeds 30 times mean income, on the basis of an assumed real after-tax flow of interest of 3⅓ per cent and taking the average standard of living as a reference. Eisenhauer's wealthy can earn on their net worth enough to be above the poverty threshold: with a poverty line set at 60 per cent of the median income and a risk-free net real interest rate of 2 per cent, their net worth must exceed 30 (=0.6/0.02) times the median income. On the other side, the middle class condition of being comfortably clear of the risk of poverty hinges on the buffer stocks that would prevent people from falling into poverty should something go wrong. While "incomepoverty" refers to a static condition where income is insufficient to maintain the minimally acceptable living standard, "asset-poverty" captures the exposure to the risk that this standard cannot be secured, for some period of time, if income suddenly falls (Haveman and Wolff 2004; Brandolini, Magri and Smeeding 2010) . The asset-poverty line may then be taken to coincide with a fraction of the standard income-poverty line: one half means that wealth holdings must be sufficient to maintain the individual at the poverty line for at least six months. The sense of difficulty in coping with negative events associated with asset-poverty is at odds with the economic security that is seen as an attribute of the middle class. We may want to exclude all asset-poor individuals from the middle class, although their incomes are well above the poverty line.
We examine the importance of these issues by means of the LWS database which contains household-level data on both income and wealth for ten rich countries. Given data availability, we have selected five countries: the Federal Republic of Germany (2001) Household-level information on wealth is generally reputed to be of lower quality than that on income; moreover, the degree of standardisation of definitions and collection procedures is low. Therefore, cross-country comparability is far from perfect, despite the ex post harmonization carried out at LWS. In particular, it has to be noted that total wealth is understated in Norway and Sweden, owing to the valuation of real property on a taxable rather than market basis, and much less seriously in Germany, where certain items are only recorded for values exceeding a minimum level. Yet, the LWS data provide some useful insights on the role of wealth in delimiting the middle class. At the other extreme, to define asset-poverty we consider both financial assets alone, which include assets that can be easily monetized, and net worth, which includes all marketable assets net of all debts (excluding the value of business equity, because unavailable in some countries): the former can be seen as an indicator of "emergency fund availability", while the latter is an indicator of "the long-run economic security of families" (Haveman and Wolff 2004, 151) . Coherently with this interpretation, to measure asset-poverty we take a shorter reference period for financial assets than for net worth: three and six months, which correspond to asset-poverty thresholds equal to one fourth and one half of the income In brief, accounting for wealth helps to qualify purely income-based definitions of the middle class. We have focused on the role of assets either in allowing people to avoid paid employment without jeopardising their standard of living, or in protecting people's standard of living from a sudden drop of their earnings, but other aspects may be relevant, such as the role that wealth plays in sustaining upward mobility. In all five countries examined, the size of the middle class would be significantly cut should we exclude asset-poor individuals, to an extent that varies considerably across countries and depends on the wealth measure.
Class and occupation
The link between income and employment position is undoubtedly close, and both variables can contribute to draw the class distinctions. Yet, their conceptual primacy varies across disciplines. Economists tend to start from income or expenditure. In their study covering thirteen developing countries around the world, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) define the middle class as comprising all households with a daily per capita expenditure lying between 2 and 10 dollars at purchasing power parities, and then proceed to compare their consumption, investment, educational and occupational patterns with those of the poor and the well-off. The conclusion is pertinent to our discussion, and worth quoting at length:
"Nothing seems more middle class than the fact of having a steady well-paying job.
While there are many petty entrepreneurs among the middle class, most of them do not seem to be capitalists in waiting. They run businesses, but for the most part only because they are still relatively poor and every little bit helps. If they could only find the right salaried job, they might be quite content to shut their business down. If the middle class matters for growth, it is probably not because of its entrepreneurial spirit" (Banerjee and Duflo 2008, 26) .
Most sociologists would approach the issue the other way round, and focus on the positions in the labour market to fix the demarcation lines across classes. Social differentiation may be specified in terms of occupational prestige and status within a "socialhierarchy approach", or in terms of the employment relations entailed by the position of individuals in the productive process within a "class-structure approach" (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, 28-35) . Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006) adopt this second approach and show how the employment-based class position impinges on individuals' economic security, economic stability and economic prospects. Wright (1997 Wright ( , 2009 
distinguishes from this
Weberian perspective, which defines classes on the basis of access to and exclusion from certain economic opportunities, the Marxist tradition, which "… conceives of classes as being structured by mechanisms of domination and exploitation, in which economic positions accord some people power over the lives and activities of others" (Wright 2009, 102 ). This conceptual distinction aside, Wright (1997, 37) observes that the empirical categories used to estimate the class structure do not dramatically differ between the two perspectives, being largely based on individuals' occupations and employment relations.
Since Wave V, the LIS database contains a much improved coverage of labour market variables. However, original sources were not all designed to provide a careful description of labour market status, not even for the main respondent. Indeed, Mandel and Shalev (2009 , 1882 -1883 observes that "because the occupational coding schemes utilized in LIS datasets are nationally idiosyncratic, carrying out a comprehensive and reliable study of class effects requires utilizing 'income classes' -in the present case, quintiles of hourly earnings". For instance, the variable "occupation of the household's head" (D14), that would provide the information needed in the class-structure approach, presents as many as 496 different categories in the United States and 280 in Germany but only 31 in France, and is missing for
Italy and Sweden. The variable "skill level in employment of the household's head"
(SKILLHD) constitutes a reasonable substitute for Sweden and Italy, although skill categories differ in number (9 and 14, respectively) and precise definitions. Possibly for this unavoidable patchwork nature, no routine is available, to our knowledge, to compute standard social classifications from the LIS data, unlike other comparative projects such as the European Social Survey (see Leiulfsrud, Bison and Jensberg 2005) .
Nonetheless, for the five countries just mentioned, we have tried to approximate the simplified version of Goldthorpe's classification to study its overlapping with an incomebased class partition. In this classification, the "intermediate class" comprises routine nonmanual employees, lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers and small employers and self-employed workers; it is distinct from the "working class" (skilled and unskilled manual workers, low-skilled routine non-manual workers), on one side, and the "salariat or service class" (all professionals, administrative and managerial employees, higher-grade technicians, large employers), on the other (e.g., Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006, 110, 
Conclusions
The relationship between class and income distribution goes back to the origins of economic discipline, at least to the famous opening of Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1821) that the principal problem in political economy is to determine the laws which regulate the distribution of "the produce of the earth among … the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock of capital necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated". At that time, it may have been reasonable to suppose a close correspondence between social class and position on the income scale. Today, this relationship is blurred by the development of institutions that stand between the productive sector of the economy and the households sector, the state as well as private intermediaries (Atkinson 1983, ch. 9) . The entire social stratification has become more complex: the middle class, that is the object of this paper, did not even feature in Ricardo's synthesis.
Nowadays, social class and income distribution largely belong to separate fields of analysis -the former a favourite terrain for sociologists, the latter a topic largely for economists. Indeed, it is normal among economists to think of classes simply as income groupings. As we have seen, the middle class has been then identified by setting limits either in the people space, F(y), or in the income space, y. While in the former the size of the middle class is fixed and attention is focused on the evolution of the income share, in the latter population size is the main concern. This approach provides an interesting complement to analyses that focus on the bottom or the top of the income distribution. These results offer a more nuanced view of the recent evolution of economic inequality. On the other hand, when we delve into the composition of middle income groups, we find that they are internally highly heterogeneous. We have shown this to be the case as regards both wealth holdings and the position in the labour market. Economists often stress the importance of having a large middle class for economic growth, either for its consumption patterns or for its propensity to accumulate human and physical capital, as well as for democracy and the political stability of a society. Yet, it is reasonable to wonder whether a pure income characterisation of social classes is analytically satisfactory. Perhaps, it is time to re-integrate the analyses of personal incomes, of position in the division of labour, and of ownership structure. 
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